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Tindall and Smith: The Uniform Collaborative Law Act as a Teaching Tool

THE UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT AS
A TEACHING TOOL
HarryL. Tindall*
Jennie R. Smith**

I.

INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEGISLATION AS A
TEACHING TOOL

While attending the University of Texas School of Law, I had the
privilege to work as Legislative Assistant for a member of the Texas
House of Representatives. I was energized by the fast-paced negotiations
among legislators and the process of passing legislation. Likewise, I was
awakened to how powerful a tool for teaching change to a slow-moving
society a clearly drafted statute could be as opposed to convoluted case
law.
The year was 1965, and as our country was experiencing social
upheaval, Texas was slow to respond. It became very apparent to me that
legislation was a far more efficient and responsive instrument than the
common law for meeting these changes. During that legislative session,
Texas enacted the Uniform Commercial Code,' and it was amazing to
see the workings of the business community in rallying behind its
passage. Of course the Commercial Code with its extensive commentary
became the medium for teaching commercial law not only in Texas, but

* Harry L. Tindall is a founding partner of Tindall & England, P.C., a practice devoted to
matrimonial law. Among his many professional commitments and associations, Mr. Tindall serves
as a Commissioner for the Uniform Law Commission, and was Vice-Chair of the drafting
committee for the Uniform Collaborative Law Act. He serves as a member of the Board of Directors
for the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals and is a founding member of the
Collaborative Law Institute of Texas.
** Jennie R. Smith, a recent graduate of South Texas College of Law, is an associate attorney
with Tindall & England, P.C., and is a member of the International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals.
1. Millard H. Ruud, The Texas Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 44
TEX. L. REv. 597, 600 & n.24 (1966).
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nationwide. Since my law school experience with the Texas Legislature,
I have continued to witness and embrace legislation as a teaching tool.
Similar to the instructive capacity of actual legislation, uniform acts
recommended to the states by the Uniform Law Commission are also an
important teaching tool. In family law, the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") and the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act ("UIFSA") have taught states to give full faith and
credit to rulings from other states in regards to custody and child
support.2 I am honored to serve as a Texas Commissioner to the Uniform
Law Commission, and particularly honored to have participated in the
drafting of the new Uniform Collaborative Law Act ("UCLA"). The
purpose of this Article is to explore the instructive qualities of legislation
and more specifically, to explore the potential of the UCLA to be an
important teaching tool for the practice of law and to society as a whole.
II.

LESSONS FROM ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A. A BriefHistory ofAlternative DisputeResolution
The impact of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") provides an
interesting study on the instructive qualities of law. The American legal
system has come a long way since Roscoe Pound's 1906 call for change
in The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice.3 Pound's postulations, which are frequently cited as the
inception of current ADR,4 were not quickly embraced by the legal
community. Subsequent movement away from courts became apparent
in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of the "community
justice movement" that resulted in community and neighborhood justice
centers where volunteers worked to resolve neighborhood disputes. 5
While this was truly a societal movement and not one driven by the legal
community, and while ultimately these justice centers were transitory,
lawyers did play important roles in their initial formation. 6 Within the
legal community, significant movement away from the traditional

2. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 313 (1997).

§ 207

(2001);

UNIF.

CHILD CUSTODY

3. See generally Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration ofJustice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729 (1906) (asserting the need for a more effective court
administration and criticizing the contentious nature of the legal system).
4. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from
Equity Jurisprudenceand Roscoe Pound,6 CARDOZO J.CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58 (2004).
5. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 170-72 (2003).
6. See id.
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litigation process began at the 1976 Pound Conference, which sparked
sincere interest in finding alternatives to going to court.7 At this
conference, Professor Frank Sander gave an address, now very familiar
to proponents of ADR, opposing a "one-size-fits-all"'8 court system. This
later gave rise to his vision of a "multi-door courthouse"9 offering
various means of dispute resolution.o
In the past three-and-a-half decades, the quest for a multi-door
courthouse has resulted in remarkable growth in ADR." In the 1970s,
the courts adopted use of arbitration, and this was referred to as
"'mandatory non-binding arbitration,' 'court-annexed arbitration,'
and ... judicial arbitration" with the purpose being to cut the time and
cost of resolution.' 2 In the 1980s, mediation became popular first in child
custody cases.13 By the 1990s, the use of mediation expanded to many
kinds of other civil disputes as a means of expediting the disposition of
cases and reducing courts' caseloads.14
B. ADR Legislation Emerges as a Teaching Tool
Although it is not entirely clear why arbitration was the first
alternative dispute resolution of choice employed by courts, it is not
unlikely that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 was influential.' 5 As
arbitration was already being used by American businesses,' 6 by turning
to arbitration to provide more efficient and economical justice, courts
were not re-creating the wheel. In fact, because the Federal Arbitration
Act specifically recognized arbitration as a means for reaching legal
resolution, use of arbitration was a safe choice for district courts, not one
that would be questioned as to legitimacy and fairness, nor one that
would result in reversal on appeal." Inasmuch, the federal law served as
a teaching tool for state courts, instructing those courts how to manage
their dockets and how to promote resolution away from the courthouse. 8

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id at 165, 174-75, 178.
Id. at 174.
Id at 175.
Id at 174-75.
See id. at 165 & n.3, 166-67, 175, 178.

12. Id at 178 (quoting E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURTANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS I (2d ed. 1983)).

13. Id. at 180.
14. Id. at 185.
15. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
16. See Hensler,supra note 5, at 181.
17. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5,
16(2010).
18. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 167.
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As courts increasingly implemented arbitration, state legislatures passed
laws recognizing and sometimes mandating the use of non-binding
arbitration, thus demonstrating how the Federal Arbitration Act served
as a teaching tool to the states.1 9
Although the Federal Arbitration Act only provided arbitration as
an alternative to the courthouse, it can be viewed more broadly as a
teaching tool instructing the legal community that there are indeed
multiple doors to the courthouse. With broad acceptance of such
instruction, in the 1980s, mediation began to emerge as the ADR of
choice in child custody cases. 20 American businesses that had before
used arbitration began to employ mediation, and lawyers inserted
mediation clauses either in addition to, or replacing, arbitration clauses
in business contracts. 2 1 Another visible example of the growth of
mediation in the business world was the American Arbitration
Association's offering of mediation as an alternative to arbitration.22 By
the 1990s, the courts in turn began to implement mediation not just in
child custody suits, but in a wide variety of other civil suits in order to
23
promote judicial efficiency.
Mediation is no longer just a device of the courts, but it is
recognized and mandated by statutes. At the federal level, Congress has
required all federal courts to institute ADR initiatives, which largely
include mediation. 24 Likewise, individual states passed extensive
legislation recognizing and or mandating the use of mediation, 2 5 and by
2001, it was estimated that some 2500 such state laws existed.26 With the
increase of state laws regarding mediation, wide variation among those
laws created a conflict of laws among states. In response to these
conflicts, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, now known as the Uniform Law Commission, and the Dispute
Resolution Section of the American Bar Association ("ABA") joined
efforts to draft the Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA").2 8

19. Id. at 178.
20. Seeid at 180.
21. Id at 183.
22. Id
23. Id. at 185.
24. 28 U.S.C. §651(a)-(b) (Supp. V 2000); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the
Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About InstitutionalizedMediation and Its
Value, 19 OIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 583 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085 (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-101 (2009).
26. Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85
MARQ. L. REv. 9, 17 (2001).

27. Id. at 18-20.
28. Id.at2l.
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Mediation has been traditionally described in terms of its "'capacity
to reorient the parties towards [sic] each other, not by imposing rules on
them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of
their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and
dispositions toward one another."' 29 This relationship-based approach
has been touted for its ability to decrease acrimony in divorce and
custody cases and for its ability to preserve business relationships for the
future. 30 The core of mediation is guiding parties to a compromise,
which simultaneously promotes civility and keeps relationships,
domestic or business, intact.31
Mediation law can truly be seen as a teaching tool for society as the
focus on compromise has become a common approach to dispute
resolution outside of the court system.32 Both business schools and law
schools have embraced the need to settle disputes through compromise,
as is evidenced through the many course offerings regarding negotiation
and ADR. Businesses and communities regularly implement programs
for internal dispute resolution.34 Even grade school curriculum promotes
the civility of compromise. Public agencies too have embraced this focus
on compromise. The U.S. Postal Service routinely solves disputes
through its REDRESS mediation program. 3 5 Similarly, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the U.S. Air Force, and the Environmental Protection
Agency have all used mediation to resolve disputes ranging from
contracts to environmental cleanup. 36 Thus, throughout the United
States, concern for effective dispute resolution reveals that ADR
legislation has taught the value of compromise. 37 This widespread
interest in compromise and continuance of relationships reflects that
ADR law has also taught that justice can occur outside of a courthouse.3 8

29. Nolan-Haley, supra note 4, at 64 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and
Functions,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 325 (1971)).
30. John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in
Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 186 (2000).

31. See e.g., id. at 174-75 (quoting a lawyer who explained the benefits of mediation over the
traditional court system, which often creates "animosity and ill will").
32. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 165-66, 175.
33. Id. at 166.
34. See id at 172; Lande, supra note 30, at 144, 219.
35. Welsh, supra note 24, at 584.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71(1) (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §6.603(b) (Vernon
2006) (stating that collaborative law is a procedure where the parties agree "to use their best efforts
and make a good faith attempt" to resolve the dispute without judicial intervention).
38. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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Quite importantly, ADR law is a teaching tool for lawyers. It
teaches that an adversarial trial is not the only way to come to a solution.
This lesson is particularly important because, as commentators on the
American legal system have postulated, "lawyers may be particularly
well suited ... not only to make laws, but to ensure smooth functioning
of the ever diverse polity and the myriad interests that need to be
reconciled to achieve social harmony and effective government." 39
Worth noting, law students continue to be taught to focus on only what
is relevant to the rule of law, which typically excludes consideration of
interpersonal matters. 4 0 Law students are left to come to their own
understanding of interpersonal matters and how they intersect with the
law. In addition to teaching that litigation is not the only way, ADR
legislation teaches attorneys to value interpersonal relationships.
Furthermore, the law teaches that the adversarial system is limited in the
issues it can address and the outcomes it can achieve. 4 1 ADR teaches
concern for preservation of relationship and promotes the civility
42
required for such preservation.
III.

NEW HORIZONS FOR ADR: COLLABORATIVE LAW AND THE
UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT

A. Mediation as a Teaching Tool Resulting in CollaborativeLaw
Emerging in the 1990s, collaborative law is the newest innovation
in ADR, described most simply as "advocacy without litigation.3
Collaborative law is a unique interest-based approach for solving
disputes, which allows much control by the client while still providing
the client with strong advocacy.44 The process begins with lawyers and
clients on opposite sides of a case entering into a formal participation
agreement to work together for resolution.45 This agreement includes a
pledge to make a good faith effort to settle the case out of court and
39. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J.
347, 350 (2004-2005).
40. Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The "Comprehensive Law Movement," 6
PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 1, 5 (2006).
41. See id.at 10.
42. Id. at 7.
43. James K. L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict
Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 431, 432 (2002); see Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative
Law Practice:An UnbundledApproach to Informed Client Decision Making, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL.
163, 168.
44. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 9-10 (2d ed. 2008).

45.

Id. at 9, 14.
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provides that if a collaborative settlement is not reached, the attorneys
will withdraw from the case and the parties must use different attorneys
for litigation.46 Once this agreement is in place, the parties convene in
multiple joint meetings to discuss issues and goals, gather information,
and eventually, hammer out an agreement.47
With a focus on avoiding long-term destruction of relationships and
with the goals of candor, good faith participation, and selfdetermination, the genesis of collaborative law from mediation is readily
apparent. 48 Commentators have recognized that, "[s]pecifically,
collaborative law owes a debt to mediation.""9 The mediation approach
of parties working together for resolution is enhanced in collaborative
law by the dismissal of the intermediary, and in the intermediary's stead,
face-to-face meetings.50 With collaborative law's roots in mediation, it is
apparent that mediation legislation has been a teaching tool in guiding
the evolution of ADR. Mediation statutes clearly indicate the legal
system's acceptance of ADR as means for solving a dispute.5 Such
acceptance in turn has taught that the pursuit and expansion of
alternatives within ADR is worthwhile.
The ABA has given specific acceptance of the expansion of ADR
in the form collaborative law, recognizing it to be a legitimate and
ethical means of ADR.52 In response to questions raised about the ethical
nature of collaborative law, the ABA has issued a formal opinion stating
that collaborative law practice "represent[s] a permissible limited scope
[of] representation" so long as a client gives informed consent to
proceed collaboratively.5 3 The same opinion addressed issues of conflict
of interest arising in collaborative law and found that a non-waivable
conflict does not arise as a result of the contractual obligation to
withdraw if resolution is not achieved nor does it arise from the
54
participation agreement.

46. Id. at 14.
47. See id. at 54-55, 63-65.
48. See Patrick Foran, Adoption of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act in Oregon: The Right
Time and the Right Reasons, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 787, 802 (2009); Mosten, supra note 43,
at 164.
49. Foran, supra note 48, at 802.
50. Id. at 800-01.
51. See supranotes 18-25 and accompanying text.
52. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The Uniform CollaborativeLaw Act

In July 2009, the Uniform Law Commission (formerly known as
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws)
approved the UCLA. 5 Preceding the UCLA were a series of individual
state statutes recognizing collaborative law as a legally permissible way
to arrive at resolution.5 6 In 2001, Texas passed the first of such statutes
incorporating collaborative law procedures into the Texas Family Code
as means for resolution of divorce and child custody and support
matters. California, North Carolina, and Utah followed with the
enactment of their own collaborative law statutes. 58 In Texas, the
collaborative law statutes have been a teaching tool providing instruction
regarding procedure as well as teaching the legitimacy of practicing
collaborative law and of settlement outside of litigation.59 Perhaps, in
addition to serving as a teaching tool within their respective states, the
collaborative law state statutes have instructed on the importance of
creating the UCLA.
The UCLA itself has great promise as a new teaching tool within
the legal community and society. With dual goals of "standardiz[ing] the
most important features" of collaborative law and of "encourag[ing] the
continued. . . growth of collaborative law as a voluntary dispute
resolution option," the UCLA is poised to instruct on both procedure and
policy. 60 The remainder of this paper focuses on the UCLA as a teaching
tool of both.
1. Procedure Taught by the UCLA
The UCLA is straightforwardly educational in its instruction
collaborative law procedure and was drafted for application
collaborative law in all areas of civil law, not just family law. 6 1
providing a comprehensive list of definitions of terms in the Act,

on
of
By
the

55. Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., The Uniform CollaborativeLaw Act: It's Here, ALTERNATIVE
RESOLUTIONS, Fall 2009, at 29 & n.2, available at http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/
UCLA It'sHere.pdf.
56. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §2013 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to -79 (2007);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(b) (Vernon 2006); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0072(a) (Vernon
2008); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-510(1)(D), (6)(A) (2009).
57. Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for CollaborativeLaw, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ONDISP. RESOL. 73, 103 (2005).
58. CAL. FAM. CODE §2013; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-70 to -79; UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4510(1)(D), (6)(A); Foran, supra note 48, at 789.
59. Pauline H. Tesler, CollaborativeFamily Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of
Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J.DISP. RESOL. 83, 125-26 n.62.
60. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, prefatory note (2009), in 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 443
(2010) [hereinafter UCLA].
61. Id. at 434.
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UCLA clearly teaches how the Act is to be understood and
implemented.62 Furthermore, it gives practitioners a common
vocabulary. The substantive procedural instruction begins in section 4 of
the Act, which lists six discrete and minimum requirements for a
Collaborative Law participation agreement.
The participation
agreement must be a record containing the signature of the parties and a
statement that the parties intend to proceed collaboratively under that
Act and the scope of the matter being resolved. 4 Furthermore, it must
identify the lawyers involved and contain a statement by each lawyer
confirming their representation in the process.65 By such requirements,
the UCLA reinforces the benefits of protocols in practice.
By instruction on these procedural requirements, the UCLA teaches
that the process must be entered into voluntarily and that there must be a
sincere commitment to the process by all participants, including the
attorneys. The lesson that participation in collaborative law must be
voluntary is further taught in section 5 of the UCLA which specifically
disallows a court from ordering such participation.66
The UCLA instructs as to the start and conclusion of the
collaborative law process.67 It makes clear that the only way to begin the
process is to sign a participation agreement. In regard to the conclusion
of the process, the UCLA sets forth several methods including: actual
resolution evidenced by a signed record, resolution of only part and an
agreement that any unsettled issues will be resolved in a separate
process, or termination of the process. 69 Termination is distinguishable
from conclusion in that termination involves an adversarial event,
including: one party giving notice that the process has ended, one party
beginning a related proceeding without consent of all parties, one party
initiating a pleading or requesting a court hearing, or one party
discharging a collaborative lawyer or the withdrawal by a collaborative
lawyer.70 Conclusion of a collaborative case, however, does not happen
if one party consents to the other party seeking court approval of a
proposed resolution or partial resolution. 7 1 Also, withdrawal or dismissal
of an attorney may not result in termination if the party engages a new
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id § 2, at 467-68.
Id. §4, at 474.
Id. § 4(a)(1-(4), at 474.
Id § 4(a)(5)-(6), at 474.
Id. § 5(b), at 476.
Id § 5(a), (c), at 476-77.
Id § 5(a), at 476.
Id § 5(c), at 476-77.
Id. § 5(d), at 477.
Id §5(h), at 477.
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attorney and creates a signed record of intent to continue in the process
and documents the engagement and agreement of the new lawyer to
72
participate in the process.
By setting forth clear instructions for how to begin and end
collaboration, the UCLA again teaches that the process must be
intentional and voluntary. It further teaches that the parties must work
together throughout the process and that the process will be destroyed if
one party instigates litigation. Additionally, it teaches that client selfdetermination is of the utmost importance.
The UCLA explicitly teaches about the role of courts in
collaborative law. In recognition that courts retain ultimate control
over filed cases, the UCLA provides for appropriate intervention by a
presiding court.74 Despite the stay a participation agreement provides to
a pending case, a presiding court may require parties and lawyers to
provide a status report on the proceedings. Such status reports,
however, are limited so as not to reveal confidential information such as
assessments, evaluations, recommendations, or findings; but rather to
include only basic information regarding the process, such as whether
the process has occurred, has been terminated, who attended, and
whether an agreement was reached.76 Importantly, the Act specifically
provides for court intervention to issue emergency orders to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of a party or family or household member as
set forth by protective statutes. In these provisions, the UCLA teaches
that although collaborative law is a process of self-determination, courts
retain ultimate control in the interest of justice. The limitation of the
information a court can require in a status report teaches that
confidentiality must be maintained during the ADR process and that a
court must respect this requirement of the process.
The UCLA teaches about what has been called the "sine qua non of
collaborative law," which is the disqualification of a collaborative
lawyer from representing a client in litigation regarding the same matter
or a substantially related matter formerly pursued by a failed attempt at
collaborative law.78 Furthermore, the firm of the disqualified lawyer is
also disqualified from participation in a substantially related matter or

Id. § 5(g), at 477.
Id. § 6 & cmt., at 478-80.
Id. §6(c), at 478-79.
Id.
Id. §6(c) & cmt., at 478-80.
Id. § 7, at 480.
Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: An Alternative for Attorneys Suffering 'Family Law
Burnout,' THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, July 2000, at 7.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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litigation.7 9 The UCLA does however make two exceptions to the
disqualification of a collaborative lawyer's firm. First, if the
collaborative lawyer was serving a low income party without receiving a
fee, then that lawyer's firm may not be disqualified from participation in
related litigation if the collaborative law participation agreement so
provides and if the collaborative lawyer is isolated from any
participation in the litigation.8 0 A similar provision applies when one of
the parties to a collaborative law participation agreement is a
government entity. 8' Although a collaborative lawyer in the matter is
disqualified upon termination of collaborative law, the lawyer's firm
may participate in a substantially related matter if the collaborative law
participation agreement so provides and if the collaborative lawyer is
isolated from any participation in the litigation.82
In its disqualification provision, the UCLA teaches attorneys that
they, as well as their clients, must be committed to the collaborative
process. It also teaches that full candor is possible, as what one party
reveals to another cannot be used against them by the opposing attorney
in litigation. By providing exceptions from disqualification for attorneys
of low income clients and of government entities, the UCLA teaches that
collaborative law can and should be widely available and applicable to
the entire population. Thus, the UCLA legitimizes the use of
collaborative law by government entities and parties of varying socioeconomic status.
The UCLA further teaches broad application of collaborative law
by its provision for use of collaborative law despite a party's history of
domestic violence with another party.83 Such an instance requires that
the party requests the use of collaborative law, that the lawyer
reasonably believes a party's safety can be adequately protected during
the process, and that the lawyer is familiar with the ABA's Standards of
Practicefor Representing Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault
and Stalking in Civil Protection Order Cases; Standards of Practicefor
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases; and
Standards of Practicefor Lawyers Who Represent Parents in Abuse and
Neglect Cases.84 By these provisions, the UCLA urges caution in the use
of collaborative law when there have been instances of domestic
violence or abuse. Simultaneously, the UCLA teaches that domestic
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

UCLA § 9(b), at 481-82.
Id. § 10(b), at 482.
Id. § l l(a), at 483.
Id. § ll(b), at 483.
See id. § 15, at 484-85; see also id.prefatory note, at 459-63.
Id. § 15(c), at 485; see also id. prefatory note, at 459-63.
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violence victims can be served by use of collaborative law with
appropriate counsel and screening. Furthermore, these provisions
instruct the importance of comprehensively interviewing clients with
such distinct issues.
In regard to ethics, the UCLA teaches that the same professional
responsibility and obligations apply to lawyers engaged in the
collaborative law process as in any other legal setting. Specific to
collaborative law, the UCLA teaches observance of confidentiality and
privilege. As previously set forth, the Act protects the confidentiality of
collaborative proceedings by prohibiting a court from requiring that a
status report include information such as assessments, evaluations,
recommendations, reports, or findings.86 The scope of confidentiality
may also be extended or limited by agreement of the parties. However,
excluded from confidentiality is any communication during the
collaborative process indicating abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation of an individual. Likewise, the reporting of abuse or
neglect of a child is mandatory even in the collaborative law process. 89
The UCLA goes beyond providing for mere confidentiality and
teaches that collaborative law communication is privileged and not
subject to discovery. 90 Notwithstanding, evidence or information
otherwise admissible does not become protected simply because of its
disclosure in the collaborative process.9 1 The UCLA stipulates that
privilege may be waived either expressly by all parties or to the extent
necessary that a representation made about a communication would
prejudice another party. 92 Additionally, assertion of privilege may be
precluded if a person intentionally uses a collaborative law process to
engage in criminal activity. 93 Exceptions to privilege are enumerated by
UCLA and include threats of violence, proof of abuse or neglect, proof
of malpractice, and evidence that is not otherwise available when the
need for the evidence substantially outweighs the interest in protection
of confidentiality.94
The ethical provisions of the UCLA teach that a lawyer
participating in collaborative law is held to the same standards of
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. § 13(1), at 483.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
UCLA § 16, at 488.
Id. § 19(b)(2), at 488; see id. prefatory note, at 463.
Id. § 13(2), at 484; see id prefatory note, at 435.
Id. § 17(a), at 485.
Id. § 17(c), at 486.
Id. § 18(a), at 488.
Id. § 19(a)(3), at 488.
Id. § 19(a)-(d), at 488-89.
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professional responsibility applicable in any other legal proceeding.
With additional provisions for confidentiality and privilege, the UCLA
teaches lawyers and parties to be forthcoming and candid in their
meetings. Furthermore, these provisions teach that there can be an
honest exchange of information so as to foster productive negotiation.
2. Policy Taught by the UCLA
In general, the UCLA provides a paradigmatic lesson in
approaching the resolution of conflict. This lesson is implicit as the
UCLA sets forth, more strongly than any other ADR legislation before,
the policy of non-adversarial resolution as it codifies the benefits of
interest-based negotiations. Integral to the instruction provided by the
UCLA are the extensive reporter's notes that accompany the Act.95
Clearly explaining the goals and reasoning behind the collaborative law
approach, these notes are an invaluable guide to the policy underlying
the provisions of the UCLA.9 6 Collaborative law teaches the policy of a
relational approach, which acknowledges the emotional and human
dynamic involved in conflict. 97 The UCLA teaches maintaining
relationships by building a bridge to compromise, rather than destroying
a relationship in order to prevail in litigation. 98 Additionally, the UCLA
instructs an unbundled approach to legal services and promotes limited
scope representation.9 9
More specifically to parties, the UCLA promotes the policy of selfdetermination.100 To lawyers, the UCLA teaches that they can zealously
advocate for their client while still promoting compromise and the
continuation of interpersonal relationships.' 0 Furthermore, to both
parties and attorneys, the UCLA teaches the policy that resolution does
not have to be a win-lose outcome, but rather can and should be
something that all parties can embrace.10 2 This lesson is implicit in the
UCLA's requirement of confidentiality by non-parties aimed at
promoting uses of jointly retained experts who advise parties together.'0o
Rather than having an arms-length approach, the UCLA promotes

95. Id. §§ 2-17 cmts., at 467-88; see id. §§ 19-20 cmts., at 488-92.
96. See, e.g., id § 2 cmt., at 467-74; id. §4 cmt., at 474-76; id. § 5 cmt., at 476-78; id. § 7
cmt., at 480-81; id. § 11 cmt., at 485; id § 16 cmt., at 488; id. §20 cmt, at 491-92.
97. See Lawrence, supra note 43, at 432-34.
98. UCLA, prefatory note, at 426-27.
99. See id. § 9(a)-(b), at 481-82; see also id. prefatory note, at 425, 438, 440-41, 450.
100. See id prefatory note, at 426-27, 434.
101. See id. prefatory note, at 425, 427, 438-39.
102. Id. prefatory note, at 426-27.
103. Id. § 17(b)(2) & cmt., at 486-88.
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personal negotiation and face-to-face compromise.' 04 Further, the
provisions of the UCLA also teach honesty, good faith, open
communication, and respect in a negotiation process.'0o Implicit in these
qualities is a policy for civility.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Hopes are high that the UCLA can be successfully used as a
teaching tool in its capacity to further the success of ADR processes.
Law students, lawyers, and judges can benefit from learning the
provisions of the UCLA and from learning new skills in resolving
societal conflict. Adoption of the UCLA by the states will provide the
initial opportunity for teaching the Act to legislative bodies. This
educational effort will be in the great tradition of successful enactment
of other uniform acts, and following enactment, the teaching of the
UCLA to law students and collaborative professionals.

104. See id. prefatory note, at 426-27.
105. Id. prefatory note, at 426-27, 436.
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